We analysed phishing sites imitating the Turkish brands Tetik monitors. The figures in this report are based on 2,813 phishing records (1,520 distinct domains) detected between 30 May 2026 and 7 November 2026 and verified by an operator or an authority. Records flagged only by automated classification were not counted.
Last updated: November 7, 2026. The report is updated weekly with new data until the end of 2026; the final version will cover the full year.
Key findings
- Half (50%) of phishing sites hide from security scanners and show the fake page only to real visitors.
- 56% are served from a subdomain rather than a main domain.
- 22% were detected within a day of the domain being registered.
- 39% use domains older than a year.
- Of the sites that went down, 54% did so within a day of detection; 16% stayed up for more than 30 days.
- Only 13% of cloaked sites could be confirmed as taken down, against 77% of sites that did not cloak.
1. Half hide from security scanners
Cloaking was seen in 50% of records (1,402): the site shows a harmless page to security vendors' crawlers and desktop visitors, and the fake login page to visitors arriving from a phone or an ad. Checking a suspected site from a desktop and seeing a "clean" page can be misleading.
Cloaking also makes takedowns harder. 77% of sites that did not cloak were confirmed as taken down, against 13% of cloaked sites. When a registrar or host opens the site and sees the harmless page, it may reject the report.
2. Most sit on subdomains
56% of records (1,584) were served from a subdomain (e.g. brand-login.example.com). A subdomain is cheaper and faster than a new domain, and if the main domain belongs to someone else, getting it taken down can take longer.
3. Domain age: either brand new or old
| Domain age at detection | Share |
|---|
| 0-1 days | 22% |
| 2-30 days | 8% |
| 31-365 days | 31% |
| Older than a year | 39% |
Shares are among records whose domain age could be read from WHOIS/RDAP.
Phishing domains cluster at both ends. 22% are used as soon as they are registered, which is why monitoring new registrations is the fastest way to catch a fake site before it goes live. 39%, however, use domains older than a year: compromised sites, expired domains re-registered, or hosting services that rent out subdomains. Old domains slip past "newly registered" filters and live longer.
4. Which TLDs?
| TLD | Share |
|---|
| .com | 35% |
| .dev | 6.7% |
| .info | 4.7% |
| .online | 4.6% |
| .xyz | 4.2% |
| .org | 3.7% |
.tr is not near the top. Registering a .tr domain requires a Turkish ID or tax number, so fraudsters prefer international TLDs. A .com or .online address resembling your .com.tr domain is therefore the most common risk.
5. Which registrars?
| Registrar | Share |
|---|
| Dynadot | 15% |
| GoDaddy | 7.9% |
| Namecheap | 5.3% |
| Cloudflare | 3.3% |
Shares are among records whose registrar is visible in WHOIS/RDAP.
This does not mean these registrars tolerate fraud; large registrars with fast sign-up are large in every category. The practical takeaway: these are the abuse desks you will write to most, so keep your templates ready.
6. How fast do they go down?
| Detection to takedown | Share of sites taken down |
|---|
| Under 1 day | 54% |
| 1-7 days | 9.2% |
| 7-30 days | 21% |
| Over 30 days | 16% |
Of the 1,275 sites that went down, more than half became unreachable within the first day. But one in six stayed up for more than a month. An abuse report should not be sent once and forgotten; it should be followed until the site is down.
What it means for your brand
- Monitor new registrations: 22% of fake sites go live the day their domain is registered.
- Check from a phone: half hide from desktops and security scanners.
- Don't look only at new domains: 39% use old domains, and 56% use subdomains.
- Follow up until it's down: 16% of taken-down sites lived for over a month. Steps: How to take down a fake website.
Method
The data comes from Tetik's monitoring of Turkish brands: sites found through look-alike domains, certificate logs and ads, opened on real devices. Only phishing records whose status was set to "urgent" or "taken down" by an operator or authority were counted; records dismissed as irrelevant were not. Domain age and registrar come from WHOIS/RDAP; takedown time is measured from first detection to the moment the site was seen unreachable or blocked (1,275 taken-down records). Because a record's status can change later, figures may shift slightly between weekly updates. Brand and sector names are withheld for client confidentiality. Percentages are rounded.